Recognition of the point of transition between the states of life and death is often difficult. "Death" is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as both the "final cessation of vital functions" and as "being dead". The certainty with which the state of being dead is appreciated suggests that death as an event ought to be equally well circumscribed. Experience indicates that this is not always so. And yet it is essential for a variety of pragmatic and theoretical concerns to be able to document death. Historically, this has not been a major problem; being dead was clearly established by the observations of coma with apnoea and, when the importance of the circulation was appreciated, the absence of a pulse. Neither was the period of transition problematic, since in the absence of modern medical intervention, failure of one system inevitably and rapidly led to the failure of all. Technology has severed the nexus among coma, apnoea and asystole and so has blurred the distinction between life and death. Nowhere is this more clearly apparent than in the context of so called "brain death" for the purposes of organ donation. Here coma and apnoea occur for long periods with a warm body and a spontaneously beating heart.
Brain Death
Most western countries have legislated a definition of death which embraces a concept of "brain death". In Australia and the USA, establishing "brain death" requires the demonstration of the irreversible cessation of all function of the brain and is commonly diagnosed on the basis of a clinical examination revealing coma and the absence of demonstrable brainstem function in the absence of potentially reversible factors and in *F.R.A.C.P., Senior Staff Specialist, Intensive Therapy Unit. tM.D., F.F.I.C.A.N.Z.C.A., F.A.N.Z.C.A., F.R.C.A., Head, Intensive Therapy Unit.
Accepted for publication on July 28. 1994. the presence of a known, severe structural brain injury. The development of this concept was largely, though not exclusively, driven by the need to improve the quality of organs retrieved from cadaveric donors. Certainly in our own practice, formal documentation of brain death as legally prescribed would never occur if organ transplantation involving cadaveric donors became unnecessary or impossible. Even within the context of organ donation, "brain death" is a controversial notion. The validity of the currently used criteria has been disputed and will likely become more tenuous as new technologies provide new insights into brain function. Perhaps it is time it was abandoned'.
The whole brain criterion for "brain death" was chosen for both philosophical and practical reasons which recognised the primacy of the brain in regulating the integrated whole and the difficulty (if not impossibility) of achieving consensus on the prerequisites for a higher-brain criterion. However, it must be appreciated that in spite of the philosophical basis, there is an arbitrariness about any notion of "brain death". Though intellectually justifiable, the definition of "brain death" is not especially satisfying. The "brain dead" patient still doesn't look or feel dead. The beating-heart cadaver to casual observation seems more like a sleeping patient than a dead body..Certainly this difficulty with the notion of "brain death" is true for many relatives. It is probably also true for many medical and paramedical personnel. This is expressed in much of the anxiety which organ donation provokes and is perpetuated in the way the practicalities are discussed. It is difficult to tell families that their relative's body will be taken to the operating theatres for organ retrieval but it is normal to speak of taking a body to the mortuary. Relatives are offered the opportunity to view the body after the retrieval process has occurred when it has the appearance of being dead. It is difficult for ventilators and other medical equipment to cease being perceived as "life support machines" at an arbitrary moment in time while they continue to function in a totaly unchanged manner. There is a finality to the cessation of ventilation and to cardiac arrest which is difficult to separate from an understanding of the moment of death. Perhaps the best expression of this unsatisfactory nature of "brain death'' Anaesthesia and Intensive Care, Vol. 23, No. I, February, 1995 is that the event which signifies the time of death when the brain death criteria are used, the medical examination, has no relationship to any process occurring in the patient, as opposed to the obvious finality of removal of the ventilator, cessation of the heartbeat or even removal of the heart. The "irreversible loss of all brain function" which the doctors certify must have occurred minutes, hours, even days earlier. This is equivalent to the time of death of a non-beating heart corpse being the time of certification, no matter what the state of decay of the body at that time.
"Brain death" is also intellectually problematic. The philosophical principle on which "brain death" is founded is the importance of the integrative function of the entire brain. The currently used clinical criteria do not guarantee loss of function of the entire brain. Studies have demonstrated the presence of neurohumoral function in patients fulfilling brain death criteria2p3. Elec?roencephalographic studies have shown sleep-like cortical patterns in some such patients4 and brainstem evoked responses may be presents. As Halevy and Brodyl have argued these ought not be considered simply as activity in isolated cells. Each of these represents brain function to however limited an extent. They may not be present in all so-called "brain dead" patients, but this is not relevant unless the criteria for documenting brain death are extended to include these variables. Even if this were done, the presence of other function which can be detected by next year's technology cannot be excluded.
The concept of "brain death" has been widely misunder~tood~~~. This confusion has been attributed to the incoherence of the whole brain concept6 and recent calls for its abandonment cannot be lightly dismissedls8. As individual practitioners, we believe that the spirit of the legislation and the will of the community are best served by viewing the current, clinical, diagnostic criteria for "brain death" as the essential prerequisites for organ donation. From an organisational perspective a shift of emphasis away from "brain death" seems advisable. Death as a state will always be understood as the trio of irreversible coma, apnoea and asystole however the law elects to define it. What is needed is not another definition of death but rather the identification of legal prerequisites to organ donation. We believe that the currently used clinical criteria for "brain death" capably and appropriately fill this role.
Documentation of 'Brain Death"
Given this understanding of the documentation of "brain death", its use where beating-heart cadaveric organ donation is not at issue is generally not appropriate. If the rigid criteria for "brain death" are required for the termination of active treatment in some patients, how can termination of treatment in other circumstances be justified? The absurdity of this position is established by a consideration of the consequences of the slightest respiratory movement during the apnoea test. Certainly this would preclude organ donation, but would it also require that all active treatment be continued in a patient with a profound and irrecoverable brain injury? If not, why perform the assessment? An irrecoverable brain injury is the necessary prerequisite to the undertaking of "brain death" documentation. It would be negligent to perform an apnoea test in any patient with a brain injury in the absence of clinical certainty that recovery was impossible. For the termination of active treatment where organ donation is not a consideration, what is required is not another definition of death but rather a separate set of clinical criteria which recognise that a point of no return has been passed1. These should be less rigid and demanding than the prerequisites for organ donation. In broad terms, these already exist in clinical practiceg. It might be feasible to legislate prerequisites for the unilateral discontinuation of treatment, but in most circumstances more general guidelines such as those provided in the "Dying with Dignity" document of the NSW Department of Health1' are more appropriate and entirely adequate.
The clinical documentation of "brain death" requires the concordance of examination findings of two independent practitioners. More recently, it has been suggested that two temporally separate examinations should also be performed to ensure irrever-siblyI0. This has obvious practical difficulties and, as the joint Colleges' position clearly acknowledges, is not always necessary12. Formal documentation of "brain death" should not be attempted unless there is clinical certainty of an irreversible, profound, structural brain injury. The guarantee of irreversibly is not provided by a brief temporal separation of a few hours between two clinical examinations. The time frame of neurological recovery in some contexts at least may be much longer than this". Rather, it is provided by the evidence of structural brain injury and by the period of observation before the documentation of brain death. Surely it is pointless to stand twice by the bedside and watch a motionless patient through ten minutes of apnoea with severe hypercapnoea and acidosis in the absence of sedatives or metabolic disturbance, where no brain function has been observed for hours or days and where brain imaging documents severe, generalized brain injury? Not only is it pointless but repeated examinations may lead to deterioration of organ function, potentially impeding the process of transplantation which the concept of "brain death" was largely formulated to serve.
Talking to Relatives
Discussing organ donation with the relatives of profoundly brain-injured patients is never easy. The patients are often young and have sustained the brain injury in a sudden and unexpected manner. In spite of the disquiet a discussion of organ donation might provoke in medical practitioners, a duty-of-care exists toward both the patient who may have wished to be an organ donor if feasible and the relatives to whom organ donation may be a substantial consolation and the only positive aspect of an otherwise senseless, tragic death. The focus is on the patient and the relative rather than the organ recipient.
Intuitively at least the manner in which organ donation is discussed will impact on the relatives' perception of the entire process and, by extension, on the likelihood of their affirmative response, although this is very much a secondary concern. We believe that organ donation should be a routine aspect of discussion with families in whom this is a possibility. Discussions should always be frank and considerate. The pace at which families are able to assimilate information is highly variable and should be determined by the family rather than by the medical practitioner. The process begins with the first interview in which the tone for subsequent discussions is set. The process is only very rarely concluded in a single discussion. The nature of the relationship established with the relatives and the progress of the patient more appropriately determine the time at which organ donation is introduced than do pre-determined rules or guidelines. In this context we have occasionally found it valuable, even essential, to discuss organ donation with families before the advent or documentation of "brain death". We do not practise or advocate this as a matter of routine, but have found that frank and honest discussion with families cannot always be served by its prohibition.
Our experience has also suggested that discussion of organ donation should always be conditional. The process can be frustrated at any point in its progress, even after the harvesting of apparently suitable organs, so that it seems advisable to speak of organ donation as a possibility at all times and always to focus on the many prerequisites to successful transplantation. Certainly, this is the context in which organ donation is discussed prior to documentation of "brain death' '. In fact, eye donation for corneal transplantation is almost always possible and does not require the documentation of "brain death", so that it is uncommon for us to proceed to the formal documentation of "brain death" until after permission for organ donation has been granted.
Responsibility of Intensive Care Specialists
Intensive Care practitioners have a responsibility to patients and their relatives to facilitate organ donation if this was the actual or projected wish of the patient. A subordinate responsibility exists to the community and to potential recipients given that organ transplantation is widely accepted by the community and offers considerable personal and economic benefit. These responsibilites are not in conflict and are best served by the routine discussion of organ donation with the families of all potentially suitable patients with the emphasis on the wishes of the patient rather than the desire of the potential recipients.
Given the significant limitations of the "brain death" concept, we believe that as individual and collective Intensive Care practitioners we should support the current clinical criteria for "brain death" as prerequisites to transplantation, a position we believe reflects the spirit although not the letter of the current legislation. In the longer term, perhaps it would be better to abandon the concept of brain death altogether. This would simply recognise the reality of death as it is generally apprehended. In place of a legal definition of death, we need separate criteria for the termination of active therapy, for the performance of organ retrieval for transplantation and for the commencement of the rites of burial etc 1 • The common perception of death is not likely to be significantly influenced by legal definitions. Participation in the drafting of local guidelines for the withdrawal and withholding of treatment and for the conduct or organ retrieval for transplantation tends to provide a sense of ownership and hence increased involvement and commitment. Centrally derived guidelines should be consensus-based rather than majority-based and should serve not as manuals but as resources. Locally determined guidelines can be more appropriately prescriptive since they are owned by those who bear the ultimate responsibility.
